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ARTICLES
COPYRIGHT ISSUES IN ONLINE COURSES:
OWNERSHIP, AUTHORSHIP AND CONFLICT
Roberta Rosenthal Kwallt
I. INTRODUCTION
The paucity of case law involving copyright ownership of
materials prepared by university faculty reflects the reality that
copyrightable works created by academics have not historically
generated large amounts of money. Thus, early cases involving the
work product of professors reflected the custom of faculty ownership
of copyrighted materials.' Not surprisingly, universities were far
more concerned with the ownership of more profitable patentable
inventions.' As the twenty-first century dawns, however, university
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1 See Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969). See also infra notes
46-48 and accompanying text; Sherrill v. Grieves, 57 Wash L. Rep. 286 (D.C. 1929) (holding
that book authored by an army employee was not excluded from copyright protection because
the book was not considered a publication of the United States government; the court relied on
reasoning that the judiciary has not endorsed the notion that faculty works belong to their
universities).
2 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship,
Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1161, 1184-85 (2000) [hereinafter
Collaborative Research] (noting that with respect to patents, "universities now require faculty
(as a condition of employment) and students (as a condition to enrollment) to assign all rights to
inventions made with substantial university resources," in exchange for which the schools take
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interest in copyright ownership of works created by academics is
intensifying, largely as a result of the potential financial windfalls
associated with distance education Both faculty and university
administrators are reconsidering copyright ownership as technological
advances provide universities with the capability of using on-line
course materials for multiple semesters without providing additional
compensation to the faculty who actually produced the subject matter
of the course materials. Indeed, the escalating competitive
environment in higher education fosters the growing economic
influence of distance learning.'
Distance education is proliferating, although legal education has
been comparatively slow to adapt to this trend. In 1998, Concord
University of Law, the first exclusive on-line law school, opened,
engendering controversy from the outset.6 When renowned Harvard
law professor Arthur Miller was commissioned by Concord to
produce a series of videotaped lectures on civil procedure to be
delivered through streaming video from Concord's web site, Harvard
modified its faculty manual so that its professors would be prevented
from teaching, researching or acting as salary consultants to an
Internet on-line school absent special permission.7  Despite the
administrative control and share royalties); Sandip Patel, Graduate Students' Ownership and
Attribution Rights in Intellectual Property, 71 IND. L.J. 482, 492 (1996) (noting that patents
require more significant capital investment to develop, are more costly to protect, and last for a
much shorter time than copyrights).
3 See generally Kenneth D. Crews, Distance Education and Copyright Law: The Limits
and Meaning of Copyright Policy, 27 J.C. & U.L. 15 (2000). Distance education has been
defined as "a form of education in which students are separated from their instructors by time
and/or space." Gregory Kent Laughlin, Who Owns the Copyright to Faculty-Created Web
Sites?: The Work-for-Hire Doctrine's Resources Createdfor Distance Learning and Traditional
Classroom Courses, 41 B.C. L. REv. 549, 551 (2000) (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
REPORT ON COPYRIGHT AND DIGITAL DISTANCE EDUCATION 10 (1999)) [hereinafter REPORT
ON COPYRIGHT]. In the REPORT ON COPYRIGHT, the definition of "distance education" is
limited to "mediated instruction," defined as "the delivery of instruction with a teacher active in
determining pace and content, as opposed to unstructured learing from resource materials." Id.
The REPORT ON COPYRIGHT is available at http://www.loc.gov/copyright/docs/de rprt.pdf.
4 See, e.g., Michele J. Le Moal-Gray, Student article, Distance Education and
Intellectual Property: The Realities of Copyright Law and the Culture of Higher Education, 16
TouRO L. REv. 981, 997 (2000) [hereinafter Realities of Copyright Law]. See also Laura N.
Gasaway, Impasse: Distance Learning and Copyright, 62 OHIO ST. L.J 783 (2001) [hereinafter
Impasse] (documenting the escalation in the number of distance education courses).
5 See Realities of Copyright Law, supra note 4, at 1032.
6 Concord was introduced by Kaplan, Inc.
7 Robert E. Oliphant, Will Internet Driven Concord University Law School
Revolutionize Traditional Law School Teaching?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 841, 849-50
(2000). Special permission can be obtained by getting the Dean's consent and then receiving
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endorsement of high-powered academics such as Arthur Miller and
others,8 the ultimate influence of Concord on the legal academy
remains unknown at this point. One particularly formidable obstacle
to the ultimate success of Concord may be the ABA's reluctance to
offer Concord accreditation in light of its refusal to consider Concord
as anything more than a correspondence school. As such, Concord is
barred from accreditation consideration under the ABA Accreditation
Standard 304(f). 9
Despite the legal academy's reluctance to embrace distance
education, the number of institutions gravitating toward on-line
courses1° mandates attention to important legal issues surrounding the
use of this educational medium. The creation of on-line courses
presents many novel copyright issues. For example, one especially
timely issue concerns the extent to which the creators of on-line
courses can avail themselves of the fair use doctrine." This Article,
the approval of the corporate body governing Harvard University. Laughlin, supra note 3, at
557-58.
8 See Oliphant, supra note 7, at 851.
9 Id. at 874. Although the ABA published Temporary Distance Learning Guidelines in
May 1997, these guidelines reflect a relatively conservative approach toward the substitution of
distance learning technology with respect to the J.D. degree, essentially limiting students to
receiving no more than three credits in a distance learning setting. See also Helen Leskovac,
Distance Learning in Legal Education: Implications of Frame Relay Videoconferencing, 8 ALB.
L. J. Sci. & TECH. 305, 355 (1998). Interestingly, the ABA's position in this regard reflects the
reality that the precursors of today's on-line courses were the correspondence courses of the
nineteenth century. See Laughlin, supra note 3, at 552.
10 Even elite universities such as Cornell are aggressively supporting distance education.
See Oliphant, supra note 7, at 850. Distance education exists at all levels of education but it is
most common in higher education. It is estimated that by 2002, 2.2 million college students
(approximately 15% of all higher education students) will take distance learning courses.
Laughlin, supra note 3, at 555. Also, the federal government is supporting distance education
through the Higher Education Amendments Act of 1998, which provides for "financial aid for
distance education students, authorizes funding for the development of distance education
programs, and establishe[s] a 'Web-Based Education Commission' to assess the educational
software available for students." Id. (quoting the REPORT ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, at 19).
See also Realities of Copyright Law, supra note 4, at 983-84 (noting the accreditation of the
first all virtual institution).
I The fair use doctrine is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). The statute provides that
in determining whether a particular unauthorized use should be deemed a fair use, the following
factors should be considered: the purpose of the use, including whether it is for commercial
purposes; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used
by the defendant in relation to the entire plaintiff's work; and the effect of the defendant's use
upon the potential market for the plaintiffs work. Fair use is an extraordinarily flexible
doctrine, however, and courts often invoke other factors in their fair use analyses. In essence,
the fair use doctrine explicitly recognizes that some unauthorized uses of copyrighted property
ought to be tolerated, and therefore it attempts to strike a balance between the optimal use by
society of resources and the optimal level of creativity. See ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS &
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however, focuses on the ownership and authorship issues surrounding
the creation of on-line courses. Varied practices exist regarding these
issues. For example, at one institution, the University of North Texas,
professors are paid royalties when their on-line materials are used by
other instructors and are awarded some of the tuition generated from
the courses they create.12 Still, such arrangements are rare. More
typically, authorship and ownership of on-line course materials are
governed by university intellectual property policies, in which
copyright issues are gaining prominence.13 Some institutions treat
copyrighted subject matter similarly to the way in which patentable
subject matter was historically treated: the faculty is considered the
legal author but the university requires an assignment of rights in any
work made with significant university resources. 4 Alternatively,
institutions create for-profit entities, and hire faculty and students as
employees of these entities so that their works are viewed as having
been produced within the course of employment for the corporate
ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAw 441-42 (1996).
The REPORT ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, concentrates on fair use, licensing, and
related issues. This report also discusses Section 403 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
which required the Register of Copyrights to submit to Congress "recommendations on how to
promote distance education through digital technologies, including interactive digital networks,
while maintaining an appropriate balance between the rights of copyright owners and the needs
of users of copyrighted works." Id. at 12. The Register also was instructed to provide
recommendations for legislation designed to achieve this objective. See Laughlin, supra note 3,
at 559. Currently, new legislation is being proposed which will facilitate the use of copyrighted
material in on-line instruction by extending the existing copyright exemption for classroom use
of "dramatic literary and musical works" to nonprofit distance-education courses. See Senate
Passes a Bill Extending Copyright Exemption to On-line Courses, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June
22, 2001, at A36. However, these efforts will not address the authorship and ownership issues
treated in this Article.
12 Jeffrey R. Young, At One University, Royalties Entice Professors to Design Web
Courses, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 30, 2001, at A41. Before creating a distance education
course, professors at the University of North Texas sign a contract stipulating ownership
interests and the amount of future revenue from the course to which the professor will be
entitled if the university offers the course without the faculty member's involvement. This
percentage varies according to how much assistance the faculty member received from the
university in conjunction with creating the course. Administrators at the University of North
Texas have found that this policy not only has attracted substantial numbers of new students, but
also improved the quality of course offerings. Id.
13 See Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 1186. See also William R. Slomanson, Legal
Scholarship Blueprint, 50 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 431, 448 (2000) ("[U]niversities are beginning to
update their [intellectual property] policies to address 'shared rights' issues, and to cover
faculty-generated electronic and digital works."); Patel, supra note 2, at 501 n.106.
14 Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 1186 (noting also that in exchange for this arrangement,
"[t]he university agrees to handle administrative matters and to share royalties with the
creators.").
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entity. 5 Significantly, the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP) has prepared a Draft Statement on Copyright
advocating that faculty members should be the owners of
"courseware" they develop for distance education programs. 6 Still,
the validity, and ultimate enforceability, of any university policy
governing copyrighted material depends on the relevant copyright
law. 7 As this Article demonstrates, the relevant copyright law
governing the ownership and authorship of on-line courses is murky
and largely untested. 8
Of course, different models exist regarding faculty creation of
on-line course materials, and the appropriate resolution of the
authorship and ownership issues can differ depending on which
model is at issue. For example, when a faculty member prepares an
on-line course completely independently, and then places it on the
university server, there is far less of a legitimate ownership claim by
the university than if the university asks the faculty member to create
the course. Additionally, some colleges will give a faculty member a
particular amount of money to create the course. This scenario
probably results in the university having a stronger ownership
interest.
Part II of this Article explores the parameters of copyright
protection generally, and specifically how copyright applies to the
creation of on-line course materials. Part III explores issues
surrounding the general question of how the doctrines determining the
recipients of copyright's incentives should be applied in the context
15 Id. at 1187. See also infra notes 44-60.
16 Laughlin, supra note 3, at 561.
17 See Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 1189-90 (expressing reservations regarding the extent
to which university policies can address issues of collaborative authorship). Section 204(a) of
the 1976 Copyright Act requires a transfer of a copyright to be signed by the author in order to
be effective. Even if faculty can be considered the original authors of their course materials
under copyright law, universities might argue that employment contracts signed by faculty can
result in a transfer of copyright ownership to the extent they incorporate by reference university
policies providing university ownership of copyrighted materials. Laughlin, supra note 3, at
561 n.67 (noting that although no such case has yet arisen, "there is no reason to believe such
incorporation by reference would not be sufficient to effect a transfer of copyrights."). But see
Laura G. Lape, Ownership of Copyrightable Works of University Professors: The Interplay
Between the Copyright Act and University Copyright Policies, 37 VILL. L. REv. 223, 250
(1992) (questioning whether university copyright policies, even if incorporated by reference into
employment contracts, will result in a transfer of copyright ownership).
18 See Laughlin, supra note 3, at 550 (noting that litigation in this area will undoubtedly
be very fact specific and therefore provide limited precedential value until such time as several
cases have established relevant precedents).
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of on-line course materials. Part IV offers some concluding
observations.
II. AUTHORSHIP OF ON-LINE COURSES SATISFIES
COPYRIGHT'S GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF
ORIGINALITY AND FIXATION
The type of subject matter that is capable of copyright protection
has expanded over time.19 For example, computer programs, though
now subject to protection, clearly were never contemplated as a
protected category of works by the framers of the Constitution."° To
qualify for copyright protection, however, the Copyright Act of 1976
("the 1976 Act") provides that a work of authorship must be
"original" and "fixed in a tangible medium of expression.",2' As the
following discussion demonstrates, authorship of on-line course
materials clearly satisfies these statutory criteria, as interpreted by the
courts.
Preliminarily, it is important to underscore what types of creative
activity would be involved in creating an on-line course. At a
minimum, such an endeavor would involve the creation of a Web site,
the authorship and recordation of video lectures, a reading list,
perhaps commentary on the reading materials, other course materials
such as charts, outlines, and exams, and arguably the creation of a
chat room and an electronic mail discussion list.2
The constitutional grant of power is sufficiently broad to extend
to any "writing" as long as the writing is the product of an "author., 23
The Supreme Court had occasion to interpret the term "originality" in
19 The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act expressly recognizes that "[t]he first
copyright statute in this country, enacted in 1790, designated only 'maps, charts and books';
additional forms of expression, such as music, drama, and visual art" were provided for
subsequently. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51, 56-57 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664-65, 5670.
20 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving Personality and Reputational Interests of
Constructed Personas Through Moral Rights: A Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century, 2001
ILL. L. REV. 151, 161 (2001) [hereinafter Constructed Personas] (arguing that "constructed
personas" should be considered works of authorship subject to copyright protection so that the
reputation and personality interests of celebrities can be protected under copyright law's moral
rights provision).
21 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
22 See generally Laughlin, supra note 3, at 556-57.
23 Kwall, supra note 20, at 161 ("In discussing the term 'writing' in this context in 1879,
the Supreme Court in the Trademark Cases stated that the writings that are to be protected are
the 'fruits of intellectual labor."') (quoting The Trade-Mark cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)).
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Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,24 in which the
Court held that the plaintiffs white pages telephone book listings did
not contain sufficient originality to qualify for copyright protection.
Feist declared that originality mandates a minimal degree of
creativity. Moreover, Feist enshrined originality as a constitutional
requirement, 26 thereby foreclosing copyright protection for many
works deemed socially valuable, and greatly labor intensive, but
which lack this important prerequisite. Although Feist also held that
the specific requirements for originality are fairly low-independent
selection and minimal creativity27 the opinion realistically
forecloses the possibility of copyright protection for many fact-based
works in which the facts themselves constitute the expression sought
to be protected. Thus, a reading list of course materials prepared by a
professor may be protected as an original work of authorship under
Feist, but only if the selection and arrangement of such materials
constitute copyrightable expression. More doubtful would be
copyright protection for a compilation of names for an electronic mail
discussion list. In general, the more expressive the work, the more
likely it is to be considered original. Any original expression
authored by the professor, such as commentary or lectures, qualify as
copyrightable subject matter. Even outlines should fall on the side of
original expression, particularly if they contain expression as opposed
to mere listings of facts.
Thus, although there may be individual components of on-line
course materials, such as alphabetized listings, which may lack
sufficient originality for copyright protection, the components of such
course materials taken as a whole clearly would qualify for copyright
protection. No serious questions should arise, therefore, regarding the
application of the "original works of authorship" requirement.2 8
Nor does the fixation requirement pose an obstacle to the
inclusion of on-line course material as copyrightable subject matter.2
In defining the permissible means for "fixation," the 1976 Act
24 Feist Publ'ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
25 Id. at 345.
26 Id. at 345, 358.
27 Id. at 358.
28 See Constructed Personas, supra note 20, at 162 ("The original-authorship
requirement demands only that a work be an expression of a separately cognizable idea, and that
this expression originates from the author.").
It should be noted that "fixation" is not a constitutional requirement under the
Copyright Clause. Moreover, many countries protect both fixed and unfixed works under their
copyright laws. Id. at 163.
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provides that any "tangible medium of expression" will suffice,
including mediums "now known or later developed," and from which
works of authorship "can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device."30 In Goldstein v. California,3 1 the Supreme Court interpreted
the Constitution's use of the term "writings" to include any physical
rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.
However, a physical rendering is not necessarily synonymous with a
tangible rendering.
In the digital age, typing material into a computer fixes the work
just as writing with a pen did in earlier years. In MAI Systems Corp.
v. Peak Computer, Inc.,3 the Ninth Circuit concluded that a copy of
copyrighted software created in a computer's random access memory
(RAM) meets the statute's fixation requirement because it is
"sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration. '34 All of the components of an on-line course, to
the extent they embody material entered into a computer, should meet
the fixation requirement as defined in MAI Systems. Although it
certainly would be possible to print out material appearing on-line, or
to archive an electronic mail discussion for future use,35 such
additional steps are unnecessary in order to satisfy the requirement of
fixation.6
30 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
31 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
32 Id. at 561.
33 MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
34 Id. at 518 (quoting the Copyright Act's definition of "fixed," as found in 17 U.S.C. §
101 (1994)). The court's ultimate observations regarding the "fixation" requirement still have
relevance despite the reversal of the specific holding in MAI Systems by Title III of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act codified at 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1998). See also Constructed Personas,
supra note 20, at 163 n.99 for a fuller discussion of this issue.
35 See Laughlin, supra note 3, at 556-57.
36 See S. REP. No. 93-982, at 103-04 (1972) (reporting that "it makes no difference what
the form, manner, or medium of fixation may be."). The situation where a professor's lectures
are delivered in a conventional classroom setting presents more of a difficult issue regarding
fixation. Here, the problem centers on the degree to which the professor has scripted her
remarks, and the extent to which the professor follows that script during the actual class lecture.
See also Stephanie L. Seeley, Are Classroom Lectures Protected by Copyright Laws? The Case
for Professors'Intellectual Property Rights, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 163, 188 (2001) (noting the
recent passage of a California law prohibiting the sale or distribution of class notes for
commercial purposes); Maryam Ahmad, Fixated on Fixation: Reformulating the Constitution's
Copyright Clause to Protect Orally Delivered Lectures (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the author).
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Having established that on-line course materials satisfy
copyright law's general subject matter requirements, this Article now
turns to the application of three copyright doctrines that merit
substantial consideration in connection with the creation of on-line
course material. The copyright doctrines that are the focus of the
following section are work for hire, joint authorship, and moral rights.
In brief, these doctrines govern issues involving copyright authorship
and ownership, as well as the matter of protection for the integrity and
attribution interests of authors.
III. DETERMINING THE RECIPIENTS OF COPYRIGHT'S
INCENTIVES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CREATION OF
ON-LINE COURES
As discussed in the foregoing section, on-line courses clearly fall
within the scope of copyrightable subject matter. The far more
difficult issue, however, derives from the question of who should be
the recipients of copyright's incentives regarding this type of subject
matter. This issue has two facets: first, in whom should the copyright
vest; and second, what will be the impact on society resulting from
vesting any sort of ownership rights in this subject matter.
Indeed, the question of how society will be affected by vesting
ownership rights in copyrighted materials arises in every context in
which subject matter is protected by copyright law. The fundamental
doctrines of copyright law reflect the underlying reality that the
application of these doctrines necessitates a delicate balance between
a creator/inventor centered justification for protection, and one that
focuses primarily on the social benefits of protection. The most
notable example of the balance struck by copyright law between the
competing interests of individual creators and those of society is the
fair use doctrine, which explicitly recognizes that some unauthorized
uses of copyrighted property ought to be tolerated.37 Additionally, the
1976 Act details a series of exempted activities that do not constitute
copyright infringement as well as a series of limitations upon the
scope of exclusive rights enjoyed by the owners of copyrighted
property." Several of these exemptions concern the rights of
37 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
38 These exempted activities and copyright limitations are codified in the 1976 Act at 17
U.S.C. §§ 107-120 (1994). Among the most prominent statutory provisions concerning public
access are the statutory limitations involving public performance, see §110; the first sale
doctrine, §109(a); the Record Rental Amendment Act and the Computer Software Rental
Amendment Act, §109(b); the public display exemption, §109(c); the more limited rights in
2001]
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unauthorized secondary users of copyrighted property; others focus
on the interests of those who own the tangible objects in which
copyrighted works are embodied.39 Moreover, the passage of the
Visual Artists Rights Act in 1990, which codified in Section 106A of
the copyright statute limited moral right protections for certain types
of visual art, significantly altered the rights of creators of certain
copyrightable property as well as owners of lawfully made copies of
artwork covered by the statute.40
Much attention currently is being given to the right versus access
balance in the context of on-line courses in light of the pending
legislative directives focusing on the appropriate scope of fair use for
those creating distance education materials. 41  The application of the
fair use doctrine in the context of on-line course materials is a topic of
vital importance, and already it has received attention by copyright
scholars.42  This Article, however, explores the authorship and
ownership questions pertaining to on-line course materials.
Copyright authorship and copyright ownership represent distinct
sets of interests under the 1976 Act. As discussed more fully below,
copyright law provides that the author of a work is considered the
copyright owner in the first instance, absent the application of the
work for hire doctrine.4 3 Copyright doctrine also affords to the owner
of a copyright the ability to transfer the copyright, either partially or
completely, and stipulates that the owner of any particular exclusive
right protected under the copyright statute can obtain all available
statutory protection and remedies. 44 Thus, the author of a copyrighted
work can assign all of her rights to the work and completely lose the
sound recordings, § 114; and the various compulsory licensing provisions, §§ 11 (c), 112, 114,
115, 116, 118, and 119.
39 See id. § 109(a) (providing that the owner of a particular lawfully made copy of a
copyrighted work has the right to sell or otherwise dispose of that copy without permission of
the copyright owner); § 109(c) (providing for the right to display the copy publicly without the
permission of the copyright owner).
40 See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post VARA, 1 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REv. 1, 16 (1997).
41 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
42 See Gasaway, supra note 4. See also Laura N. Gasaway, Distance Learning and
Copyright: Part II, J. COPR. Soc'Y (forthcoming) (discussing proposed recommendations to
amend 17 U.S.C. § 110(2) (1994) of the copyright statute, which treats exempted performances
of works in the context of distance education).
43 See supra notes 53-93 and accompanying text.
44 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1994). Section 106 of the 1976 Act details the exclusive rights
protected under the 1976 Act. These include the exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute the
original work, to prepare derivative works, and to publicly perform and display certain types of
copyrighted works.
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ability to exercise her copyrights. Nevertheless, the author of the
copyrighted work always retains the ability to exercise certain rights
under the statute, despite a partial or complete transfer of the
copyright.4"
The following section explores the application of two copyright
doctrines affecting the ownership and authorship of on-line course
materials: the work for hire doctrine and joint authorship. In addition,
by addressing the application of moral rights to the creation of on-line
course materials, it also treats the intersection of economic rights
under copyright law with more personal protections for authors.
A. Work For Hire
The issue of whether universities or faculty members own
scholarship and other course materials has been the subject of
litigation, although not in the context of on-line course materials.
One such case decided in 1969 involved faculty lectures. In Williams
v. Weisser,4 6 the defendant operated a business that published and sold
the lecture notes of a professor of Anthropology at the University of
California at Los Angeles (UCLA). The defendant paid a UCLA
student to attend the plaintiffs course, take notes, and type them up.
The defendant then placed a copyright notice in these notes,
subsequently reproducing and selling them.
This case was decided under the 1909 Copyright Act, under
which unpublished works were protected by state common law
copyright. The defendant disputed the professor's ownership of the
copyright by asserting that the common law copyright in the
plaintiffs lectures belonged to his university. The court rejected this
argument, concluding that the common law copyright in these
materials was owned by the professor, rather than the university for
which he worked, absent evidence that the professor had assigned
such materials to the university. The court also noted several
"undesirable consequences" which would follow from a contrary
holding.47 For example, vesting the copyright in the university would
complicate situations when a professor changes jobs and wishes to
give the same lecture at his new university. Would the old university
45 These rights include the ability to terminate transfers and licenses of the copyrighted
work under certain conditions, id. §§ 203(a) and 304(a), and the exercise of moral rights under §
106A. See infra notes 115-51 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion of moral
rights.
46 Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
47 Id. at 546.
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own the copyright to lectures given there, and would the professor's
former university be able to prevent the professor's subsequent use of
these materials elsewhere? If such were the case, any university
hiring a professor laterally would then have to determine the extent to
which the professor's lectures were subject to ownership by another
entity.48
Williams v. Weisser was decided under the copyright statute in
existence prior to the current statute, the 1976 Act. Under the current
law, however, the question of ownership of teaching materials and
faculty scholarship would be decided by applying the specific
statutory provision embodying the work for hire doctrine.49
Application of the work for hire doctrine to faculty work product is
highly controversial, with legal scholars advocating different views
on whether and how the doctrine should be applied in this context.50
Some commentators believe that even if cases such as Williams v.
Weisser supported the existence of a "teacher" exception under the
1909 Act, the 1976 Act abolished such an exception.5 Other scholars
dispute this conclusion.5 2 As will be discussed below, a large part of
the difficulty resides in the flexibility surrounding the application of
the current provision of the statute.
Section 201(a) of the 1976 Act provides that the copyright in a
protected work "vests initially in the author or authors of the work.,
53
48 Id.
49 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining a "work made for hire").
50 For commentary disfavoring the application of the work for hire doctrine to academic
work product, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of
1976, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 590 (1987); Sunsil R. Kulkami, All Professors Create Equally: Why
Faculty Should Have Complete Control Over the Intellectual Property Rights in Their
Creations, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 221 (1995); Lape, supra note 17, at 223; Seeley, supra note 36, at
174-76; Russ VerSteeg, Copyright and the Educational Process: The Right of Teacher
Inception, 75 IOWA L. REV. 381 (1990); James Wadley & JoLynn Brown, Working Between the
Lines of Reid: Teachers, Copyrights, Work-for-Hire and a New Washburn University Policy, 38
WASHBURN L.J. 385 (1999). For a contrary perspective, see Leonard DeBoff, An Academic's
Copyright: Publish and Perish, 32 J. COPR. SOC'Y U.S.A. 17 (1985); Todd Simon, Faculty
Writings: Are They "'Works Made For Hire" Under the 1976 Copyright Act?, 9 J.C. & U.L. 485
(1983); Margaret D. Smith & Perry A. Zirkel, The Implications of CCNV v. Reid for the
Educator-Author. Who Owns the Copyright?, 63 EDUC. L. REP. 703 (1991). See also Sherri L.
Burr, A Critical Assessment of Reid's Work for Hire Framework and its Potential Impact on the
Marketplace for Scholarly Works, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 119 (1999) (advocating an
interpretation of the statute which would allow for varying results for different types of
academic works). For a recent discussion of the controversy surrounding the application of the
work for hire doctrine to academic work product, see Collaborative Research, supra note 2.
51 See, e.g., DuBoff, supra note 50, at 17; Simon, supra note 50, at 485.
52 See Lape, supra note 17, at 240-46; Seeley, supra note 36, at 173-74. See also infra
notes 60-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the judicial commentary on this issue.
53 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994).
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The statute also provides that "[i]n the case of a work made for hire,
the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is
considered the author . . .unless the parties have expressly agreed
otherwise in a written instrument signed by them. .. ." " Thus, the
work for hire doctrine is an exception to the rule that copyright
ownership vests initially in the work's creator, and in recognizing this
doctrine, the United States probably is the only country that allows
the employer of a work's creator to obtain "authorship" status."
The statute provides that a work is made "for hire" under two
alternate circumstances. First, a work can be a work made for hire if
it is "prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment. 56  Second, a work that is specially ordered or
commissioned for certain types of uses can be a work for hire, but
only "if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by
them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire."57 One
of the pertinent statutory categories is "an instructional text," and thus
there is the possibility that on-line courses in their entirety could be
considered works made for hire under this specific provision.
However, application of this part of the definition of a work made for
hire requires an express written agreement by the parties involved.
This specific written requirement probably would not be satisfied by
the incorporation by reference into a faculty member's contract of a
university intellectual property policy giving the university rights to
on-line courses created by their faculty. Nevertheless, in those rare
instances when universities and their faculty do agree in writing, the
application of this provision of the work for hire doctrine treating
specially ordered or commissioned works might apply. In applying
this provision of the statute, however, it is reasonable to question
whether untenured faculty can realistically decline to sign a document
stipulating that their on-line course is a work for hire.
54 Id. § 201(b).
55 DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 11, at 318.
56 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining a "work made for hire").
57 Id. According to subpart 2 of the statutory definition, a work will qualify as a work
made for hire if it is "specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective
work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a
test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the
work shall be considered a work made for hire."). Id.
58 See supra note 17. See also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 560 (2d Cir.
1995) (discussing the specificity with which courts have construed the statutory writing
requirement), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1010 (1995).
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Undoubtedly, the more problematic part of the work for hire
definition as applied to the creation of on-line course materials is the
first subpart, which provides that work done by an employee within
the scope of her employment is considered a work made for hire.
Under this subpart, there is no requirement of a signed written
instrument executed by both parties. The work for hire determination
turns completely on whether the professor is considered an employee
of the university, and whether preparing the on-line course materials
comes within the scope of her employment. Little doubt exists that a
professor is an employee of the university where she teaches, but for
purposes of applying this provision of the statute, the real question is
whether the faculty member is an employee for purposes of creating
the on-line course materials. 9
The work for hire provision of the 1976 Act has been litigated
rather sparsely in the context of academic work products. In one
case, Weinstein v. University of Illinois,60 the plaintiff, a pharmacy
administration professor, proposed a clinical program for practicing
pharmacists, to be funded by his university. Three professors who
agreed to write jointly on the results made the proposal to the
university jointly. Plaintiff ultimately sued his co-authors, university
administrators, the university, and its trustees under 42 U.S.C. §
1983,61 claiming that his co-authors mutilated his work and stole the
credit, thereby denying him due process of law.62 The district court
dismissed the complaint, concluding that the article was a "work for
hire" and owned by the university. The court based its conclusion on
the University's Work for Hire policy, which provided that "[w]orks
created as a specific requirement of employment or as an assigned
59 See Wadley & Brown, supra note 50, at 400 (observing that "to the extent that the
doctrine embodies the parties' expectations and presumptions, the term 'scope' would include,
in the context of the copyright law, only those things in which the parties anticipate that the
employer should hold the copyright and not necessarily everything that the hired party produces
while working.").
60 Weinstein v. Univ. of Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987).
61 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (subjecting to liability every person who deprives another of
Constitutional rights while acting under color of law).
62 See Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1092-93. Weinstein and one of his co-authors apparently
disagreed about the content and conclusions of the proposed article. Although Weinstein had
written one draft, his co-author wrote a second draft. Subsequently, the department head, as
well as the Dean of the College of Pharmacy, urged the collaborators to resolve their differences
and publish the article. Weinstein's co-author submitted his version of the article to the
American Journal of Pharmaceutical Education and it was published with Weinstein's name in
third place. Id.
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University duty" are works for hire.63 Therefore, because the
University funded the clerkship program and because the plaintiff was
required to conduct and write about clinical programs as part of his
clinical professor duties, the article qualified as a work for hire.'
The Seventh Circuit disagreed, however, concluding that the
district court's broad interpretation of the university's copyright
policy was not warranted by the evidence presented in the case.65 In
so holding, the Seventh Circuit emphasized the tradition under which
professors retain the copyrights in their scholarly articles and other
intellectual property, a tradition supported by the university's
copyright policy, which provided for only three specific exceptions to
this general rule.66
The following year, the Seventh Circuit had another occasion to
comment on the work for hire doctrine in the context of academic
work product in Hays v. Sony Corporation ofAmerica.6 7 In that case,
plaintiff high school teachers sued a corporation for copyright
infringement based on the defendant's modification of an instruction
manual for word processors that the plaintiffs had prepared at the
request of their school. Although the court did not expressly decide
whether the teacher exception had survived the enactment of the 1976
63 Id. at 1094.
According to the [University's copyright] policy, which is a part of each
professor's contract with the University, a professor retains the copyright unless
the work falls into one of three categories:
(1) The terms of a University agreement with an external party require the
University to hold or transfer ownership in the copyrightable work, or
(2) Works expressly commissioned in writing by the University, or
(3) Works created as a specific requirement of employment or as an
assigned University duty. Such requirements or duties may be
contained in a job description or an employment agreement which
designates the content of the employee's University work. If such
requirements or duties are not so specified, such works will be those for
which the topic or content is determined by the author's employment
duties and/or which are prepared at the University's instance and
expense, that is, when the University is the motivating factor in the
preparation of the work.
Id. The application of subpart 3 of the policy was at issue in Weinstein.
64 Id.
65 Id
66 See id. The court did, however, observe that copyright law is sufficiently broad "to
make every academic article a 'work for hire' and therefore vest exclusive control in
universities rather than scholars." Id. See also VerSteeg, supra note 50, at 402 (discussing how
the court in Weinstein became "the first court to acknowledge, albeit in dicta, that, absent either
an agreement to the contrary or an expressly recognized 'teacher exception,' the work-for-hire
doctrine applies to scholarly articles written by university professors.").
67 Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988).
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Act, it indicated that it would be inclined to retain the exception based
on policy considerations, coupled with the absence of an express
indication that Congress had intended to alter the law as previously
applied.68
Subsequently, the Supreme Court attempted to give some
definitive context to the "scope of employment" component of the
work made for hire definition in Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid.69 The facts of Reid are completely divorced from
the university context. In Reid, the defendant nonprofit organization
commissioned Reid, the plaintiff sculptor, to create a sculpture of a
homeless family. Neither party signed a written agreement defining
its rights and neither party mentioned copyright. 70 After the sculpture
was completed, it was returned to Reid for repairs. Upon Reid's
refusal to return the sculpture, the organization brought suit, seeking a
return of the sculpture and a determination of copyright ownership.7 1
As the work in Reid did not fit within any of the categories
enumerated under subpart (2) of the work made for hire definition,
and as no written agreement existed, the Supreme Court was faced
exclusively with the application of the "scope of employment"
provision of the statute. Noting the absence of a statutory definition
for the terms "employee" and "scope of employment," the Court
determined that Congress intended these terms to be interpreted in
light of the general common law of agency.72 In so holding, the
Court adopted a long list of factors that are relevant to determining
whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law
of agency, as opposed to an independent contractor. The overall
consideration, according to the Court, is "the hiring party's right to
control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished., 73 According to the Court, the other factors relevant to
this determination include:
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the
location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the
parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional
projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion
over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the
hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work
68 See id. at 416-17.
69 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
70 Id. at 734.
71 Id. at 735.
72 Id. at 740.
73 Id. at 751.
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is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the
hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and
the tax treatment of the hired party.74
Applying these factors to the issue of on-line course creation
results in factors being present on both sides of the argument. A
number of factors militate in favor of on-line courses being regarded
as works made for hire under copyright law. Universities clearly
withhold federal and state taxes, pay its employer's share of F.I.C.A.
taxes, and provide other important employee benefits. The method of
payment can be especially suggestive of an on-line course being
considered a work for hire in those instances where a university
awards a faculty member a particular amount of money to create an
on-line course. Also, universities unquestionably have the right to
assign faculty members additional projects and professors
undoubtedly use their institutions' computers, software, and other
instrumentalities to create on-line course materials.75 On the other
hand, faculty are highly skilled professionals and few university
administrators are inclined to become involved in micromanaging the
creation and content of an on-line course. Moreover, most faculty
members probably enjoy total discretion in the selection of research
assistants, and in deciding when and how long to work.
The issue of a faculty member's discretion over when and how
long to work can present, however, some difficulties when applying
the work made for hire doctrine, especially when this factor is
considered in conjunction with the factor emphasizing the location of
the work. At first blush, it seems reasonable to suppose that much of
the work performed in creating an on-line course would have to be
done at the university itself, and if such is the case, the faculty
member may be somewhat constrained by the work schedules of
other university employees upon whom she is dependent for support.
Typically, designing an on-line course would require creating a Web
74 Id. at 751-52.
75 Most faculty placing work on a Web site use their institution's libraries and
on-line services to conduct research in preparing the work; computers and
software to conduct research and to create the work; space on a server to
store the work; Internet connection to make the material available to the
world; and, depending on skill level, the assistance of other institutional
employees throughout the process of making the material available to its
intended audience. Were a faculty member to use her own personal
computer and software to research and create the material and acquire and
pay for "publication" space from a commercial Internet service provider,
then this factor would support a finding that she is not an employee.
Laughlin, supra note 3, at 571.
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page for every component of the course, including a separate Web
page for each lecture. Software such as a program called Microsoft
FrontPage facilitates an individual's ability to design an on-line
course and create such Web pages. This software can be installed
into any computer, and therefore, a faculty member with this software
can design an on-line course and create the Web pages from her home
computer.76 On the other hand, professors might need to rely on their
universities' services and hours of availability to create certain course
components, such as a threaded discussion board. Also, on-line
courses might require additional external services provided by the
university, such as those of video producers, computer programmers,
computer assessment specialists, 77 and Web site designers. Another
issue is how these factors should be applied in the situation where a
faculty member creates the on-line course over an extended period of
time, during which she worked at a number of different institutions.78
Moreover, a faculty member may incorporate into on-line courses
materials developed while working as a consultant or through non-
academic outside activities.79
The factor focusing on whether the work is part of the regular
business of the hiring party also can create some troublesome
questions. Hypothetically speaking, should the creation of an on-line
course at Concord University, the only law school in the country that
is exclusively on-line, be considered a work made for hire even if the
creation of courses at other law schools is not so considered? Should
the creation of on-line courses at universities that do not offer
conventional classroom experiences be more apt to be considered
within a faculty member's scope of employment, particularly if
faculties at totally on-line universities have no publication duties?
For that matter, even at mainstream universities, should the
university's particular mission influence the work made for hire
determination when the creation of an on-line course is at issue? For
example, it could be argued that at universities more focused on
research and publication, a work made for hire determination
regarding the creation of on-line courses is much less supportable
76 Interview with Alex Kowalski, Webmaster, DePaul College of Law, Chicago, Ill.
(May 23, 2001).
77 The skills of assessment specialists might be required in conjunction with computer
examinations.
78 See Laughlin, supra note 3, at 571-72 (noting that "[e]ducators are not likely to leave
behind the material they prepared for a course at one institution when they take a position at a
different institution.").
Id. at 572.
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than it would otherwise be at universities more geared toward
teaching as their primary mission."0
In my view, difficulties would abound if the work made for hire
determination were dependent on consideration of such institution-
specific criteria. A much more practical, and administratively viable,
interpretation of the current law is to treat the creation of on-line
courses in just the same way as any other academic work product. As
the analysis in William v. Weisser suggests, the presumption is that
faculty members own the copyrights to their lectures.81 The same
reasoning surely should apply to faculty members' scholarship and
other work products, although some commentators have argued to the
contrary." As discussed below, the creation of on-line course
materials does entail somewhat different considerations from more
conventional academic work products. I believe the ultimate analysis
applicable to on-line course materials should be consistent with that
which governs other genres of academic work products.
Vesting copyright ownership of conventional course lectures and
other academic work products in faculty does not entail a significant
degree of monetary loss or administrative disruption to the university.
In contrast, regarding the creation of on-line course materials, an
educator's claim of copyright ownership can result in depriving the
university of the benefits of its monetary and time expenditures in
creating the courses. Distance learning materials also generate
tremendous profits for the university, and such profits will be
diminished to the extent universities must negotiate subsequent uses
of the materials with the faculty members who create the courses.8 3
Moreover, a university's inability to continue to use particular
distance education materials can potentially disrupt an entire distance
learning program.84
Still, these differences do not support vesting exclusive rights to
the intellectual content of on-line course materials in the university.
Initially, if such courses are considered works made for hire, the
80 "[S]chools that have commercial development and profit as their primary motive for
offering distance learning courses will most likely seek greater institutional control of
intellectual property." Realities of Copyright Law, supra note 4, at 1030. "[I]nstitutions
interested in supporting the traditional academic culture may want to consider allowing faculty
members to retain rights to their instructional material." Id. at 1032.
81 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
82 See supra note 50.
83 This is a particular consideration where the university has provided additional
resource services in facilitating the creation of the course. See supra note 77 and accompanying
text.
84 See Laughlin, supra note 3, at 580.
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faculty members who create them will find themselves in the
anomalous situation of being deemed copyright infringers upon using
their courses at other universities, absent their ability to invoke the
fair use doctrine. The successful invocation of the fair use doctrine
by a faculty member in this context is remote, however, to the extent
a professor makes use of an entire on-line course for commercial gain
at another institution.
Moreover, the conventions of academia support the position that
even with respect to on-line course materials, copyright ownership
presumptively belongs to the faculty creator. All educational
institutions have the dissemination of information and the
advancement of knowledge as their primary goals. These goals, in
fact, are consistent with the policies underlying the Copyright Clause,
namely "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors ... the exclusive right to their
respective writings .. . ."" The incentive-based rationale underlying
copyright protection has, in fact, driven at least one university to pay
royalties to professors whose on-line materials are used by other
instructors, as well as a percentage of the tuition generated by the
courses. 8 7 Administrators at the University of North Texas are betting
that such measures "will spur widespread development of on-line
courses and course materials."88
One commentator has suggested that the issue of ownership of
on-line courses should be resolved by affording universities a
"perpetual, non-exclusive license to use of the videotapes, computer
files or other media comprising the distance learning programs.
89
Such a license "also should permit the institution to revise and update
course materials for its distance learning programs." 90  This
recommendation appears to strike a positive balance, at least initially.
Yet, even if the work made for hire doctrine were amended to
incorporate explicitly this suggestion, the application of such a
provision would raise other critical issues. As discussed in Part IIIC
85 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
86 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also Wadley & Brown, supra note 50, at 419
(observing that "to the extent that educational institutions are dedicated to the dissemination of
information, they support and reinforce the goals of the copyright system.").
87 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
88 Young, supra note 12, at A41.
89 Laughlin, supra note 3, at 580. See also Lape, supra note 17, at 261 (advocating same
approach to general issue of ownership of copyrightable works). Professor Lape also proposes
the notion of faculty reimbursing their universities for resources used, but notes that such an
alternative will not advance the university's interest in generating revenue. Id.
90 See Lape, supra note 18, at 264.
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of this Article, the United States' legal system does not embrace the
notion of moral rights for creators of copyrightable works other than
certain categories of visual art.9' Therefore, even if faculty members
retain copyright ownership of the course materials, no law exists to
mandate that professors receive a right of attribution when their
universities subsequently use their course materials, or to insure that a
professor's name is removed if such is her desire. Moreover, no legal
recourse exists for a professor who objects to the manner in which the
university modifies or updates the original materials.92 As the law
currently stands, such moral rights interests must be provided for by
contract since United States copyright law does not insure faculty
members the ability to protect these types of personal interests.93
B. Joint Authorship
In Community for Creative Non- Violence v. Reid,94 the Supreme
Court suggested that the sculptor and the non-profit organization
might be considered co-owners of the copyright if, on remand, the
district court determined that they met the statutory requirements for
joint authorship. 95 Indeed, often courts holding that a particular work
is not made for hire must examine whether the facts at issue
nonetheless justify a conclusion ofjoint authorship.96
91 See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
92 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994)) has been
invoked by some plaintiffs who complain that due to unauthorized modifications, their work no
longer represents their original vision. See, e.g., Choe v. Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, 920 F.
Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (unsuccessful § 43(a) suit by law student against law journal for
publication of his article with many errors). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides a remedy
for use of either a "false designation of origin" or a "false description or representation" in
connection with goods or services. However, § 43(a) cannot be used as a substitute for moral
rights doctrine in light of the vastly different objectives with which these doctrines are
concerned. Specifically, § 43(a) is concerned with economic interests, whereas moral rights
vindicate personal and reputational interests.
93 Cf Laughlin, supra note 3, at 580-81 (recommending that the non-exclusive licenses
awarded to universities incorporate such provisions treating attribution issues).
94 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). See also supra notes
69-74 and accompanying text.
95 Reid, 490 U.S. at 730. On remand following the Supreme Court's opinion, the district
court determined that Reid should be recognized as the sole author of the sculpture and that he
has sole ownership rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) regarding all three-dimensional
reproductions of the sculpture. The court also ordered that CCNV is the sole owner of the
original copy of the sculpture, and that both parties are co-owners of all § 106 rights respecting
two-dimensional reproductions of the sculpture. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
Civ. A. No. 86-1507, 1991 WL 415523 (D.D.C. Jan. 7, 1991).
96 See, e.g., Weinstein v. Univ. of Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987), discussed
supra at notes 60-66 and accompanying text and infra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
See also SHL Imaging Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Muller
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The 1976 Act defines a "joint work" as one "prepared by two or
more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged
into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole. 9 7 The
statute does not contain any definition of the relevant terms, although
the intention to merge the contribution is the key concern.98 The most
influential federal circuit courts in the area of copyright law-the
Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits-have interpreted this statutory
provision so that joint authorship requires two components: 1)
independent copyrightability of each contribution; and 2) intent by all
putative authors at the time of the collaboration that they be co-
authors.9 9 In these circuits, the more rigorous "intent to be joint
authors" standard is substituted for the "intent to merge" standard.
The difference between these standards is not insignificant. Under
the "intent to merge" standard, joint authorship conceivably can result
even if a party provides a less significant contribution, as long as both
parties intend to merge their contributions. In contrast, the "intent to
be joint authors" standard de-emphasizes the act of collaboration at
the expense of mutual intent to be joint authors, thereby insuring a
result favorable to the collaborator disputing joint authorship."10
Of course, joint authorship will not be a major concern for
professors who work independently, although many professors
potentially face the possibility of a research assistant who provides
some degree of assistance claiming joint authorship of the final work
product. In general, such claims will not go far in those circuits
invoking the "intent to be joint authors" standard. After all, few
v. Walt Disney Prods., 871 F. Supp. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Respect, Inc. v. Comm. on Status of
Women, 815 F. Supp. 1112 (N.D. I11. 1993).
97 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining a "joint work").
98 See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, "Author-Stories ": Narrative's Implications for Moral
Rights and Copyright's Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 48-49 (2001)
[hereinafter Author-Stories] (noting also that although the legislative history similarly fails to
define key terms, it furnishes a conception of joint authorship that focuses on either the act of
collaboration or intent to merge).
99 See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000) (joint authorship suit
by an advisor for film); Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998) (suit by dramaturge of
play Rent against the playwright's heirs); Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061 (7th
Cir. 1994) (affirming injunction against theater company from performing plays to which
plaintiff playwright owned the copyrights); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991)
(copyright infringement suit by playwright against an actress who had furnished the playwright
assistance in connection with a play). But see Author-Stories, supra note 98, at 52 (observing
that although some courts have not embraced standard for joint authorship, its acceptance by
three of the most prominent federal appellate courts in copyright requires that it be given serious
attention).
100 See Author-Stories, supra note 98, at 55-57 for a more complete discussion of this
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professors intend to share joint authorship status with their research
assistants, no matter how much assistance they provide. In addition,
the independent copyrightability standard will also thwart joint
authorship claims by research assistants whose contributions do not
translate into an independently copyrightable product-specifically, a
product that is an original work of authorship.''
In contrast, when professors collaborate with one another, or
even with graduate students performing substantial research and
writing duties, problems can arise. Cases have arisen involving
authorship disputes in academic settings, although not in a digital
context. In Weissman v. Freeman,0 2 the court was faced with a
situation involving the authorship of a derivative work, 0 3 in which an
established professor and his accomplished assistant collaborated on a
number of prior scholarly works. Weissman, the more junior
colleague, claimed sole authorship of an article that was derived from
a collaborative effort. Freeman subsequently used Weissman's article
in his materials for a particular course, and he deleted Weissman's
name, replacing it with his own."° The Second Circuit reversed the
district court's determination that, as a matter of law, Freeman's joint
authorship of the prior works made him a joint author of the
derivative work.'0 5  The court articulated a standard for joint
authorship of derivative works: "First, each putative author must have
'contributed' to the work. Second, each must intend to contribute to a
joint work at the time his or her alleged contribution is made."'0 6 In
this case, the evidence established that Freeman had not made any
contributions to the derivative work at issue, apart from his
contributions to the underlying work. Moreover, purportedly
applying the standard that joint authorship does not result unless all
parties intend to merge their contributions,0 7 the court determined
that no joint authorship resulted in light of Weissman's lack of intent.
101 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994); supra notes 23-27.
102 Weissman v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1989).
103 Section 101 of the 1976 Act defines a "derivative work" as "a work based upon one or
more preexisting works, such as [examples omitted] or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted." Moreover, "[a] work consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaboration, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of
authorship, is a 'derivative work."'
104 See Weissman, 868 F.2d at 1316.
105 Id. at 1317.
106 Id. at 1318.
107 Subsequent Second Circuit decisions clearly apply the more rigorous "intent to be
joint authors" standard. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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A close reading of the case indicates that the court was not
entirely clear on whether it was applying the "intent to merge" the
contributions standard, or the more rigorous "intent to be joint
authors" standard.'0 8  More troubling, however, is the court's
suggestion that the absence of Weissman's intent precludes a finding
of joint authorship, regardless of Freeman's intent. The court fails to
explain why one party's intent should dominate the inquiry. Perhaps
the court just assumed this analysis was appropriate in light of
Freeman's failure to contribute to the derivative work at issue. Even
so, the court's application of the intent standard in this regard
facilitated the development by future courts of a test for joint
authorship in which the dominant author's intent takes precedence
even in cases where other parties also contributed to the work at
issue.'09
As discussed, Weissman v. Freeman involved a derivative work,
and the copyright law provides that copyright protection exists for
derivative works independent of the protection afforded the
underlying work."0 The creation of on-line course materials clearly
can involve the use of works derived from previously existing
copyrighted works. Where the professor creating the on-line course
was not an author of the preexisting works used, the extent to which
use of the underlying work is allowed will be determined by
application of the fair use doctrine, absent the involvement of a
license."' On the other hand, when the professor creating the on-line
course alleges that he co-authored the underlying work used in a
derivative manner in the on-line course, the joint authorship
principles invoked in Weissman and other courts will apply to
determine whether the underlying work was the product of joint
authorship. The same joint authorship principles will apply to the
108 See Weissman, 868 F.2d at 1319. The court relies on the statutory "intent to merge"
standard, but also states: "[T]he rule has evolved that an author who intends to create a joint
work must clearly demonstrate his or her intent in that regard. . . . [I]n the absence of such a
showing, the work is presumed to be the product of an individual author .. " Id.
109 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 99. See also Author-Stories, supra note 98, at 55 &
n.252 (citing commentary critical of the case law requiring that all putative joint authors share a
mutual intent to be joint authors); Mary LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive
Collaborator: Preserving the Rights of Joint Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193, 216 (2001) (noting
that "Weissman's unnecessary introduction of a new intent requirement introduced an
unfortunate sleight-of-hand into the joint work analysis" and that "this questionable analysis has
now been applied in a series of cases ... ").
110 "The copyright in [a derivative work] is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge
the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting
material." 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1994).
III See supra notes II and 85 and accompanying text.
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issue of whether a particular on-line course is a jointly authored
product, regardless of whether the course itself is a derivative effort.
In those jurisdictions requiring independent copyrightability as well
as intent by all putative joint authors to establish joint authorship,
individuals who contribute to a joint product, but whose efforts do not
constitute the dominant portion of the work, risk being denied joint
authorship status. The authorship status of a given work is significant
because under copyright law, joint authors have "equal" undivided
interests in the whole work, meaning that they can unilaterally use
and license the work, subject only to the duty to account to their
fellow joint authors for profits. 112
In addition, a question exists as to whether a collaborator to an
on-line course who is denied joint authorship status can nonetheless
make a subsequent use of those parts of the course he created
independently, without obtaining the permission of the copyright
owner. If the non-dominant collaborator is not able to use the
materials he contributed, he will be in the anomalous position of
being deemed a copyright infringer for using the parts of the on-line
course he did create, unless he can justify his use under the fair use
framework. 13
In sum, the manner in which the joint authorship doctrine has
been applied has the potential for creating significant difficulties for
those who collaborate on ventures resulting in on-line course
materials. Courts must be willing to confront directly these
difficulties in the context of all joint ventures. Moreover, a statutory
revision of the joint authorship provision would be helpful to the
extent it acknowledges that the economic interests of joint authors do
not have to be equal, and incorporates "meaningful collaboration" as
112 See, e.g., Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1998). But see Author-
Stories, supra note 98, at 57-58 for a critique of the "equal" sharing of profits standard in the
joint authorship context.
113 See supra notes 53-93 and accompanying text for a similar discussion regarding the
work for hire doctrine. Professor Dreyfuss has noted that a void exists regarding the legal status
of collaborative works that do not fall into either the work for hire or joint works categories.
She concludes that such works fall into "the Larson gap" with an indeterminate legal status. She
adds that "[p]erhaps they are to be considered authored solely by the dominant author; perhaps
they are not fully exploitable by anyone--until courts start facing the ramifications of
dispositions like [Thomson v.] Larson, there is no way to be certain." See Collaborative
Research, supra note 2, at 1217.
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the touchstone rather than independent copyrightability of the
contributions and mutual intent.'
14
C. Moral Rights
Although copyright law is intended to provide economic
incentives for the creation of works of value to the public,115 the
works that are subject to copyright protection reflect a bifurcated
origin. On the one hand, they are subject to commodification in much
the same way as any other tangible form of property. Yet, copyright
law protects works "that are the product of the creator's mind, heart,
and soul," '116 and the very act of creating such works implicates the
honor, dignity, and artistic spirit of the author in a fundamentally
personal way.117 Therefore, complete protection for copyrightable
works must embody important personal interests in addition to
economic safeguards.
Copyright law in the United States is concerned almost
completely with protecting the pecuniary rights of copyright owners.
By assuring the copyright owner the exclusive rights to reproduce and
distribute the original work, to prepare derivative works, and to
perform and display publicly certain types of copyrighted works, the
1976 Act focuses on the inherent economic value of a copyright.1 18 In
contrast, moral rights, which are well established in many European
and Third World nations, enable authors to safeguard their personal,
as opposed to pecuniary, rights in their works. 9 Despite differences
114 See Author-Stories, supra note 98, at 64. See also Collaborative Research, supra note
2, at 1220-24 (advocating the creation of a new category of multi-authored works under
copyright law in which rights and duties would be allocated proportionally).
115 Monetary rewards to the individual author or inventor are viewed as an essential
incentive for spurring production of valuable types of innovation, rather than as a critical end in
and of itself. On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has observed that the promotion of
the arts and sciences is the primary purpose of the monopoly granted to copyright owners, with
financial rewards to creators as a secondary concern. See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510
U.S. 517 (1994); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). See also H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909); supra note 86 and
accomPanying text.
1 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage
Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1, 2 (1985).
117 See Author-Stories, supra note 98 (arguing that the author's perspective has been
submerged in the development of copyright law).
118 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
119 Interestingly, in recent years, there has been a renewed interest in moral rights abroad
in countries such as Russia, Vietnam, and Hong Kong. As of this writing, however, a European
Union Directive on moral rights still has not surfaced. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Moral
Rights for University Employees and Students: Can Educational Institutions Do Better Than the
U.S. Law?, 27 J.C & U.L. 53, 60-61 (2000) [hereinafter Moral Rights for University
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in content among those countries that maintain moral rights
provisions, some universal aspects of the doctrine do prevail.
Moral rights doctrine encompasses the following three major
components: the right of disclosure, the right of attribution, and the
right of integrity.' 21 Underlying the right of disclosure is the idea that
the author, as the sole judge of when a work is ready for public
dissemination, is the only one who can possess any rights in an
uncompleted work. The right to determine the timing of a work's
public dissemination has particular significance for academics whose




The right of attribution safeguards an author's right to compel
recognition for her work and to prevent others from naming anyone
else as the author. It also protects an author's negative rights of
anonymity and psesudonymity 22  The right of integrity lies at the
heart of the moral rights doctrine, as it prohibits any alterations of an
author's work that will destroy the spirit and character of the creator's
work. 123
In 1988, the United States joined the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the oldest multilateral
treaty governing copyright protection. As a result, American creators
can now obtain increased copyright protection internationally.
Section 6 of the Berne Convention recognizes a right of attribution
and a right of integrity, but the treaty contemplates that the specific
legislation of the respective Union members will govern substantive
Employees]. For a discussion of the reasons underlying the difference between the limited
protection afforded creators' moral rights in the United States, and the scope of this doctrine in
many other countries, see id. at 59-62 and the sources cited therein. The disparity in protection
afforded moral rights among different nations presents an increasingly difficult challenge in the
digital age. Indeed, "the possibilities of borderless exploitation of works, the endless ways of
using digital work and the changes in how works are created" give rise not only to greater
potential for moral rights violations but also highlight the difficulties presented by varying laws
and enforcement mechanisms among different nations. See Moral Rights for University
Employees, supra, at 62 (citing Thomas P. Heide, The Moral Right of Integrity and the Global
Information Infrastructure: Time For a New Approach?, 2 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 211,
214 (1996)).
120 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is An American Marriage
Possible, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985). (The Copyright Act of 1976 continues this country's
tradition of safeguarding only the pecuniary rights of a copyright owner. "By assuring the
copyright owner the exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute the original work, to prepare
derivative works, and to perform and display publicly certain types of copyrighted works, the
Copyright Act of 1976 focuses on the inherent economic value of a copyright.").
121 See Moral Rights for University Employees, supra note 119, at 53.
122 Id. at 54.
123 Id.
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applications of these rights within each member country. When the
United States joined the Berne Convention, Congress believed that no
additional moral rights protections were needed in this country given
the presence of certain other federal and state doctrines.' 24  In
addition, several states provided specific statutory moral rights
protections for certain types of works, notably visual art. In 1990,
however, Congress enacted the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), a
measure that was intended to enhance moral rights protections in the
United States. This provision is codified in § 106A of the Copyright
Act, and its effective date was June 1, 1991.125 VARA's scope is
extremely narrow, as it applies only to visual art, and even then, only
to a narrow range of visual art.126  On-line courses are completely
outside the scope of VARA's protection, leaving faculty who create
such courses with no effective moral rights in this country.
I have argued elsewhere that the copyright law's failure to
protect authors' personal interests is especially devastating to those
who create within the university confines.1 27  The university setting
provides an atmosphere with the potential to breed moral rights
violations. Yet, the case law addressing moral rights, or "quasi"
moral rights violations in the university context reveals that moral
rights interests are not being adequately addressed, or safeguarded, in
the current legal system.
128
A review of the cases involving universities and their personnel
in the context of moral rights types of claims reveals various
litigation patterns. For example, students have sued both universities
as well as professors.'29 Additionally, professors have sued students
as well as their universities.13 ° Although the factual situations giving
124 See Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). See also the Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) as well as common law doctrines such as unfair competition, breach of
contract, defamation, and invasion of privacy law.
125 Moral Rights for University Employees, supra note 119, at 54-55.
126 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994) (limiting VARA's protections to visual artists who create
certain categories of works which include paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, or still
photogaphic images produced for exhibition purposes only).
1 See Moral Rights for University Employees, supra note 119.
128 Id.
129 See, e.g., Rainey v. Wayne State Univ., 26 F. Supp. 2d 963 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (student
sued university, her professor, and company based on the company's use of her artwork in an
objectionable manner); Choe v. Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, 920 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(suit by student based on law review's publication of his article with errors).
130 See, e.g., Seshadri v. Kasraian, 130 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 1997) (suit by professor against
student for publishing under student's name paper allegedly written by professor); see infra
notes 137-39 and accompanying text; Weinstein v. Univ. of Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.
1987) (suit by professor against university and its trustees based on publication of an article with
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rise to these lawsuits vary, the underlying themes of many of these
cases involve violations of authors' rights of attribution, integrity, and
disclosure. None of the reported cases deal with on-line courses, but
it is easy to imagine scenarios where moral rights types of claims can
be raised in conjunction with the preparation and use of on-line
course materials. For example, to the extent students participate in
the creation of on-line course materials, these materials could be
modified by their supervising professors or their universities so as to
violate the students' integrity or attribution interests. 3' Moreover, as
discussed earlier, even if faculty are able to retain copyright
ownership of their on-line course materials subject to certain use
privileges by their universities, the lack of moral rights protection in
this country fails to insure faculty a right of attribution, or a right of
non-attribution if such is a professor's wish. Additionally, a professor
who objects to the manner in which the university modifies or updates
the original materials may have little chance for successful redress. 3
Even if the modifications themselves were authorized pursuant to a
valid license, without additional protections for the personal and
reputational interests safeguarded by moral rights, academics are
insufficiently protected.
Of course, reputational interests are critical in most law suits
implicating moral rights types of controversies. As a general matter,
although other legal doctrines are occasionally invoked in the United
States as substitutes for moral rights, the case law reveals that these
substitutes do not adequately address the reputational interests at
stake in moral rights disputes. 33 Moreover, what distinguishes moral
rights oriented cases in the university context is the recognition that
often university faculty or students have relatively no commercial
interest in their creations. Indeed, many academics do not create for
the purpose of obtaining royalties, but instead desire widespread
dissemination of their work for the sole purpose of building their
professional reputations. 134  Still, as discussed earlier, the creation of
the authors' names in the wrong order; see supra notes 60-66 and infra notes 140-46 and
accompanying text).
131 See generally Patel, supra note 2, at 505 (observing that "[t]he fact that the parties are
a university and a student, as opposed to an employer and an employee, only exacerbates an
already troublesome form of assigning ownership rights.").
132 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
133 See Moral Rights for University Employees, supra note 119, at 63-67 for an expanded
treatment of this issue.
134 Id. at 63. The Internet exacerbates the reputational interests at stake by facilitating
other types of moral rights violations of concern to academics apart from the on-line course
issue. In September 1999, an article appeared in the Chronicle of Higher Education discussing
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on-line course materials, with their high potential for financial gain,
necessarily interjects financial interests into the calculus. 35
Therefore, in the context of on-line course materials, a faculty
member's reputational and economic interests converge.
Additionally, academic environments give rise to many co-
authorship arrangements, and such collaborative efforts often result in
difficult disputes involving moral rights types of concerns. The case
law demonstrates that no adequate cause of action exists in this
country to address a moral rights violation committed by one co-
author who, in the opinion of her co-authors, mutilates the work.
13 6
For example, Seshadri v. Kasraian137 involved a joint authorship
dispute between an electrical engineering professor at the University
of Wisconsin and his graduate student. The court held that the work
at issue was jointly authored. 138  Additionally, the Seshadri case
the prevalence of Internet companies engaging in the practice of paying students to take class
notes and then posting this material on the Web. See CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 1, 1999, at
A3 1. This disturbing practice is extremely troublesome for reasons extending beyond copyright
law's concern with unauthorized reproductions and distributions. Suppose, in a conventional
classroom setting, a professor engages in a dialogue with her students as part of a lecture in
which she attempts to sketch out a new theory or research idea. The professor's objection to a
posting of such a lecture clearly will encompass a claim that her work is not ready for
dissemination in a public form and that she is the only one with the ability to judge when her
work will be ready for a public airing. Although the practice of posting such lecture notes on
the Web may be'actionable as a matter of copyright law, an application of the current copyright
law, which is concerned exclusively with economic compensation, does not theoretically
address the reputational harm caused by premature publication of her work. This scenario also
can give rise to the publication of lecture notes in an altered state, with important errors and
omissions. If the altered lecture notes were explicitly connected to a particular professor, she
also could allege a violation of her right of attribution. Moreover, the right of attribution also
allows an author to compel recognition for her particular work. Therefore, even if the lecture
notes did not contain errors, but were not in any way designated as deriving from the professor's
particular class, the right of attribution is implicated. See Moral Rights for University
Employees, supra note 119, at 65. Obviously, these same concerns also can arise ifa university
were to use and modify on-line course materials.
135 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
136 See Moral Rights for University Employees, supra note 119, at 67.
137 Seshadri v. Kasraian, 130 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 1997).
138 Id. The professor and student allegedly co-authored an article published in the
Journal of Applied Physics. When they initially submitted the article to the journal, the
student's name was listed first. Subsequently, the professor had a substantial disagreement with
the student, and the professor withdrew the manuscript from the journal prior to its acceptance.
The student then resubmitted the article under his own name, signing an assignment of
copyright to the publisher of the journal upon the article's acceptance. The professor contended
that upon taking this action, the student infringed his copyright because the professor was the
sole author of the work. In contrast, the student argued that the article was a joint work, and as
such he was entitled to license the copyright to a third party, subject only to a duty to account.
The court rejected the professor's argument, based on the evidence that the student contributed
significant copyrightable material. Id.
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involved the interesting issue of how joint authorship rules interface
with moral rights. On this point, the court observed:
If a joint work is marred by errors reflecting unfavorably on his
coauthor, with quantifiable adverse effects on the coauthor's
career, the coauthor might conceivably have some legal remedy,
but it wouldn't be under the Copyright Act. We don't know what
it would be under: possibly the law of contracts; in Europe it might
be a violation of the author's "moral right" (droit moral), the right
to the integrity of his work .... But all that matters here is that a
joint author does not lose his copyright by being a lousy scholar;
were that the rule, rights of joint authorship would be in legal
limbo.139
The interface between joint authorship and moral rights in
academia also arose in a case discussed earlier in the "work for hire"
section, Weinstein v. University of Illinois.140  In that case,
Weinstein's co-author submitted a version of their jointly authored
article to the American Journal of Pharmaceutical Education and it
was published with Weinstein's name in third place. In his lawsuit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Weinstein essentially sought to redress the
violation of his moral rights by arguing that his co-authors mutilated
his work and stole the credit. The Seventh Circuit noted that co-
authors can make changes in a work and publish the original or the
revision. In a footnote, the court observed that "Weinstein tries to
avoid" this result by asserting moral rights. 41 According to the court,
however, Weinstein must fail in this respect because "no jurisdiction
has created the sort of moral right Weinstein invokes, let alone
created any moral right through judicial decision., 14 2 Therefore, this
federal court was "not about to foist so novel a principle on
Illinois."'43
Weinstein is a troublesome opinion to the extent it underscores
that no remedy exists for a joint author when her fellow joint authors
publish her work in an altered, or objectionable state.'" To the
plaintiff in Weinstein, the order in which his name appeared on the
article was significant for several reasons having to do with his
139 Id. at 803-04 (citations omitted).
140 Weinstein v. Univ. of Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987). See also supra notes
60-66 and accompanying text.
141 Id. at 1095 n.3.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 See Moral Rights for University Employees, supra note 119, at 70.
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professional standing.145 Regardless of the validity of these reasons,
the state of the law is such that he has no forum in which to litigate
these issues, and no remedy for any such proven violations.'46
The law's omission of a remedy for copyrighted works that are
unilaterally mutilated or altered in an objectionable manner by one
joint author is problematic. When joint authors collaborate with
respect to on-line course materials, there is the potential for serious
damage to a joint author's moral rights. Again, given the state of the
law in this country, such damage can escape redress unless it is
treated contractually. The problem with exclusive reliance on
contractual provisions, however, is that non-dominant contributors
may face significant obstacles in obtaining contractual provisions
insuring these types of rights. 1
47
I have argued elsewhere that universities face particular types of
challenges in dealing with their personnel with respect to moral rights
issues. Specifically, universities are in a unique position because they
provide a refuge from the outside world. Within the confines of the
university, authors are free to indulge in the creative process, often
without having to be unduly concerned with an economic bottom line.
In this respect, the nurturing creative environment afforded authors by
universities differs substantially from the harsher realities of the non-
academic world.148 Thus, universities have special responsibilities to
safeguard the moral rights of authors operating within their creative
environments by protecting their authors' moral rights, providing
more moral rights education, and encouraging their administrations
and faculties to be protective of authors' moral rights. 1
49
Universities should provide assistance to their faculty, students,
and employees in securing moral rights in connection with all works
of authorship, 5 ' including on-line course materials. Indeed, under the
model suggested earlier, under which faculty members own their own
on-line course materials subject to non-exclusive licenses for use by
145 For example, Weinstein argued that his not being listed as the first author precluded
his use of this topic for a dissertation; diminished his accomplishments among other professors;
and hampered his ability to show citations under his name given the prevalent practice of listing
citations only under the name of the first author. See Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1093.
146 See Moral Rights for University Employees, supra note 119, at 70.
147 See generally Author-Stories, supra note 98, at 54-55 for a further discussion of this
point.
148 See Moral Rights for University Employees, supra note 119, at 79.
149 Id. at 79-81.
Id. at 79.
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their universities,' it is especially important that such licenses
provide adequate moral rights protections. Otherwise, faculty
members are left unprotected if the university takes inappropriate
attribution measures or otherwise modifies the materials in an
objectionable fashion.
IV. CONCLUSION
In many ways, professors and other educators enjoy a privileged
existence. Many of us enjoy lifetime job security and high social
status, based on our perceived intellectual abilities. Moreover,
academics experience enormous satisfaction on a daily basis as we
facilitate an awareness of, and appreciation for, our subject matter in
our students. Candidly, both undergraduate and graduate university
professors are able to enjoy life at a somewhat more leisurely pace
than individuals in the corporate world, to the extent we are
unconstrained by the demands of clients and other external forces.
In many ways, then, an academic existence truly is an idyllic
one. Even so, many academics typically forego the substantial
economic rewards that are available to other individuals with
comparable educational backgrounds. Although professors at
graduate and professional schools often chose to use their expertise
by consulting for the corporate sector, this choice remains an
individual one rather than an avenue required to achieve prominence
in the academy. Indeed, for professors, the publication of scholarly
works continues to be the hallmark of success. For the most part,
professors find great intellectual stimulation in the authorship of their
work products, be they scholarly articles, books, or even the
compilation of new course materials.
Our society's advancement depends upon the willingness of
people inclined to devote themselves to educational enterprises, even
if the economic rewards of these endeavors are not as great as they
would receive elsewhere.'52 As a group, academics probably value
their reputations, as well as their personal freedom and creativity,
151 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
152 See, e.g., Lape, supra note 17, at 266 (noting that depriving professors of
supplemental income derived from their copyrightable works could result in a departure of
professors with otherwise marketable skills); Kulkami, supra note 50, at 248-50 (advocating
that professors possess complete rights in their intellectual property creations so that talented
faculty are more likely to remain in the academy).
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more than they do a substantial income. 5 3 Professors take great pride
in their works of authorship, crafting them with loving care.
Although concern for the ownership, authorship, attribution, and
integrity rights of educators with respect to their works of authorship
is not new, this Article has treated these issues in the context of the
relatively new medium of on-line course materials. Overall, the
foregoing discussion has demonstrated that copyright law does not
require a particular revision to deal specifically with these issues as
they pertain to on-line course materials. Such materials should be
treated much the same as any other academic work product. Even so,
the existing applications of the work made for hire, joint authorship
and moral rights doctrines do require some adjustments if educators
are to be insured their interests will be protected adequately.
153 See VerSteeg, supra note 50, at 407 (noting that teachers "often fashion creative
educational materials not so much for financial gain, but for the satisfaction of the endeavor for
its own sake and the pride that flows from seeing an original idea come to fruition and achieve a
specific educational objective.").
